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ABSTRACT
in this paper we specify and estimate a structural limited dependent
variable model with which we study both the health and retirement status of
the elderly. Standard linear estimators, which assume that these variables
are continuous, are not appropriate and categorical estimation techniques are
preferred. Our model differs from previous work in that we have longitudinal
data and random effects that are correlated over time for different
individuals. The problem is made more complicated because there is sample
truncation, which could potentially bias coefficient estimates, since
approximately twenty percent of the individuals in our sample die. We outline
the full information maximum likelihood estimator for such a model and
implement it in our empirical analysis. With our structural estimates we
analyze, among other things, the degree to which endogeneously determined
health status affects the probability of retirement and how changes in social
security benefits and eligibility for transfer payments modify both







(215) 898—7708Substantial empirical interest has been focused recently on the question
of how health and retirement decisions are related. The empirical work to
date typically has used a reduced form model and, most recently, nonlinear
specifications such as the multinomial logit (Anderson and Burkhauser (1983))
or hazard rate model (Hausman and Wise (1983a)) have been used. Standard
linear estimators, which assume that these variables are continuous, are not
appropriate and categorical estimation techniques are preferred. The
aforementioned studies have generally found that health and retirement are not
independent and that health and Social Security wealth have significant
effects on the retirement decision.
In this paper we focus on the efficient estimation of a structural model
of the health and the retirement decisions of the elderly. Our model differs
in part front previous work in that we have longitudinal data and random
effects that are correlated over time for different individuals. Efficient
estimation of a structural system of limited dependent variables such as ours
in the context of a panel data set has to our knowledge not been
implemented. The problem is made more complicated because there is a twenty
percent death rate and hence sample truncation which could potentially bias
coefficient estimates.
We build the full information maximum likelihood estimator from the
univariate results of Butler and Mofitt (1982) and use it in our empirical
analysis. With our structural estimates, we can analyze, among other things,
the degree to which the endogeneously determined health status affects the
probability of retirement and how changes in Social Security benefits and
eligibility for transfer payments modify both healthiness and the demand for
leisure. The studies cited above addressed these issues in part but either
used inefficient estimators or based their findings on reduced form models.
Another study which focused primarily on retirement (Hanoch and Honig (1983))
1did not control for random effects. By controlling for heterogeneity we can
be more precise and can examine the extent to which ignoring heterogeneity
could bias parameter estimates. Furthermore, we can test whether or not a
systems estimator has any empirical appeal by a direct test of the
significance of the covariance parameter.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 discusses the economic
model of joint health and retirement status and the variables that enter into
it. Section 2 outlines the statistical model.. Section 3 discusses the data
set used in the analysis and reviews our estimation results. Section 4
concludes.
1. The Model
Our model contains both a health and a retirement equation. The
retirement equation is based on the assumption that an individual maximizes a
utility function given by:
(1.1) U =u(C,L,H)
where C is consumption, L is leisure, and H is health.'
Health is included to account for pain and suffering and shifts in tastes,
e.g., some activities may be less desirable if you have a physically limiting
health problem such as arthritis.
Equation (1.1) is maximized subject to a budget constraint and a health
production function given in equations (1.2) and (1.3).
(1.2) =
w(T—L)+ rA + X PcCt + H
(1.3) Ht =F(Age,z, Or))
where w is the hourly wage rate, T is total time (hours) in time period t, r
is the return on financial investments, A is the amount of financial assets, X
'Although our model is a long—run static one, some elements of other periods
are allowed to enter via discounting future benefits.
2Is other sources of income including earnings of a spouse,Pc is the price of
consumption, H is the price of medical care, Z is the amount of medicalcare,
and 0 is job and personal characteristics.
In principle it is possible to find the first order conditions fora
maximum and to obtain demand equations for health, for hours of work and
leisure, and for consumption. However, since the theoretical model of
retirement is well known and since the information available to us does not
allow us to obtain labor supply elasticities, we will merely specify the
arguments entering each of the equations.'-
The standard retirement model asserts that an individual compares the
utility generated from working versus that from fully or partially retiring.
Utility differs in these situations because working is unpleasant and because
income differs. If retired, the individual may be eligible for Social
Security benefits and pensions. If he works, he may forfeit all or a part of
these benefits and pensions but he receives a wage or salary. Future Social
Security and pension payments may also be changed if retirement is
postponed. Thus we wish to include in the retirement equation the benefits if
retired permanently, the expcted change in the benefits if retirement is
postponed a year, wage earnings if the person works, and other sources of
income.
While anecdotal stories exist that suggest retirement per se causes bad
health via boredom, we are not aware of any firm evidence that retirement
debases health. To the extent that economic decisions are made in a rational
fashion, retirement should not directly modify the unobservable health
stock. Moreover, Ekerdt (1983) in a detailed study based on medical
examinations found retirees' health deteriorated no more than that of a
2See Parsons (1980), Boskin (1977) or Quinn (1977).
3control group of nonretirees. Thus we specify a triangular model with health
affecting retirement but with no feedback from retirement to health.3
The general specification of the health equation is based on the work of
Anderson and Burkhauser (1983), Grossman (1972), Lee (1982), Taubman and Rosen
(1982), and Taubman and Sickles (1984). The unobservable health stock is
endogeneously determined and can be augmented by investment in health services
or depreciated by the environment of the work place. The health stock differs
across individuals and families and is determined in part by: social and
fiI'PArQ11rh p1iitilirn 1tyuQt 'iinPnnr.ip nd —
degreeto which an individual Is able to gain access to information on
available health services which we proxy by marital status, number of
children, and education; and ability to pay for health services for which we
include income, assets, spouse's income, and pension and social security
benefits.
We omit from the analysis in year t those already dead. However we
include these same people in earlier periods if alive. During the 8 years the
survey spans, more than 20% of the Initial respondents died and there is a
selectivity problem whose solution is discussed below.
2. Statistical Model
Our statistical model Is an extension of the single equation limited
dependent variable model of Heckman (1981). The longitudinal nature of the
data set is accommodated by using a conventional error components
specification (Balestra and Nerlove (1966)) in which heterogeneity between
individuals Is modeled as a random effect. There are two equations in our
system ——onewhich links health status to the retirement decision and one
3A statistical test of this maintained hypothesis —whichis accepted ——is
discussed in Section 3.
4which models changes in the unobservable health stock. Since we argued
earlier that these are jointly determined, a systems estimator would be
expected to yield more efficient estimates than limited information
techniques. In this section we outline both full information (FIML) and
limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimators.
The system can be written as
—(1) +(1)
(2.1) —x1i cit
*(2)=I2Yjt+ x2 + 1, ...,N
t—1,•.•,T
where
(2.2) =(j)+ (j 1, 2)
and where
a (j)+ a(j)forj=l, 1k, ts
E[4 CksI =a(j)forjl, 1=k, t*s
a for j*1, i=k, t=s
v1v2
0 elsewhere
Here and are (lxk1) and (lxk2) vectors of exgoneous variables,
and are conformable vectors of structural coefficients,
and are scalar unobserved dependent variables whose observed
counterparts are and y; 2 is a scalar coefficient for the right—
hand—side endogeneous observable, and and are the errors in the two
equations which are decomposed by the rule in (2.2). The unobserved are





5with A1), A1) normalized at —,+respectively, and
(2.5) = i A2 — < —
x22,j=1,2
with A2 arid 42) normalized at ,4wrespectively.
Equation (2.4) is the polytomous probit with ordered responses and (2.5)
is a binary probit. We use the standard normalization that
=1,j=1,2. We furthermore assume that the errors are distributed
normally, with joint density f(r.(1)eis(2)0) where
S = We assume that the parameter space is
compact, that the likelihood LN 0)based on N panels is a
**() *(2) continuous function of 0 for every set y ={y Y5 J,that
(1/N)1og(y*; 0) converges to a function Q(0) almost surely uniform for
every 0, and that this function has a unique maximum at the true parameter
point. We furthermore assume that the log likelihood function is three times
differentiable, and that the absolute value of the third derivative is bounded
by some function with finite expectation (Cramer (1946)). Based on these
assumptions the maximum likelihood estimate of 0 is consistent and has the
limiting distribution given by v'N (0—0)N(O,Z1) where 9. is the Fisher
information matrix. A computational issue arises when implementing FIML since
calculation of the joint probabilities of observing differing configurations
of health—retirement states for the same individual over the T time periods is
problematic if the number of time periods is large. Our data set contains
five biennial periods. Since the calculation of the joint retirement—health
states for an individual at time t requires two dimensional integration, the
calculation of the set of retirement—health states for an individual over (at
most) five dependent time periods requires ten dimensional integration.
6Numerical methods for handling such problems are available (Clark (1964)) but
are both computationally burdensome and have an approximation error which is
difficult to bound.
Fortunately, the evaluation of multi—dimensional integrals is made much
simplier by the particular form for the correlation pattern of disturbances
implied by the variance components model. This point has recently been made
by Butler and Moff it (1982) for simpler univariate probit models. For the
joint model a similar approach can be taken.
We ftrst defIne the domaIns of IntegratIon over whIch the varIous
functionals are evaluated. Since there are eight possible configurations ——
()() ——thereare eight domains (D1,...,D8). Let R be the domain
corresponding to a particular configuration of health—retirement states and
examine the joint probability of observing this generic configuration for the




For the ith individual the joint probability of observing the T health—
retirement states is
(1) (1) (2) (2) (1) (2)
f...JdF = ffii,...,eIT cil '''1T )d11 •..dcjT




7d 'd (2)ld 2'd(1)
vit vit i 2
=f h1(i41/i42)[5eh3(z)dz] di4'
(2.6) Jeh4(w)dw
This last expression can be evaluated using the Hermite Integration
formula
2 G
jeWh4(w)dw = w.h(w.) — j=l
where G is the number of evaluation points and h4(wj) is h4 evaluated at w.
The evaluation Is done in a nested fashion with evaluation of the bivariate
distribution function, for which highly accurate algorithms exist, left as the
only numerical burden.






We turn our attention now to the way in which sample truncation is
handled and to the calculation of estimates of 0 •Theformer point must be
addressed since sample attrition occurs over time as people die and, for a
particular individual, the conditional probability of an observed health—
retirement state (with health state possibly deceased), given that the person
was alive in the previous period, is a function of the joint probability of
not having died in all previous time periods. Sample truncation can be
handled by conditioning the joint probability of retirement—health states for
an Individual on the joint probability that the indivtdual was alive in the
previous periods. If the individual dies, he is removed from the sample in
8the next period. Call this joint probability P(o;y*) and denote the modified
likelihood function as LN(O;y ).Underthe conditions outlined above the FIML
estimates have the limiting distribution
* *
NlogL logL
N (O—e) +N(O,lim[. ] i=1
To generate LIML estimates, first estimate the health equation using the
single equation analogue of our bivariate model. Next estimate the quasi—
reduced form for the retirement equation conditional on the observed health
state using maximum likelihood. Finally concentrate the likelihood function
(2.7) with respect to all parameters except and maximize it with respect
12
to the single covariance parameter. Note that all these calculations
utilize P(o;y*) instead of Pi(O;y*). The LIME.. estimates can also be used in
a single Newton—Raphson iteration to yield consistent and asymptotically
efficient estimate of 0.
3. Data, Variables, and Estimation Results
The data come from the Retirement History Survey (RHS) which contains
five biennial panels taken during the period 1969 through 1977 and
individually matched records of Social Security earnings beginning in 1951.
The sample contains about 8500 men who were heads of households in 1969. It
contains objective health information such as data on death and
hospitalization and subjective information such as how your health compares
with others of the same age and how it has changed over time.
Our dependent variable indicator for retirement is constructed in the
4Because of potential differences in the way women and men perceive their
health, we deleted 2500 women heads of household from our analysis and put off
estimating a model with a fully interactive female status dummy.
9following fashion. One question asked in the RHS is "are you presently
working part time, full time, or are you retired?" We chose to use the
working full—time/not—working—full—time dichotomy instead of either deleting
those who are semi—retired or introducing a new category for retirement
status. We have examined models in which we use semi—retired as another
category and found comparable results. We rely on either the retired or not
retired results for simplicity and comparability with most other studies.
Turning to the health measure, we find a number of empirical studies
which conclude that health affects retirement decisions. (See footnote 2.)
Many of these studies have used one of two health measures. The first is the
answer to a question like "Does your health limit your ability to work or to
get about?" For people who retired prior to their 65th birthday, this type of
question allows, and perhaps invites, the subject to cite health limitations
as a socially acceptable reason. A second health measure frequently used is
whether or not a person died within some follow—up time interval. Used alone
this is also a far from ideal measure. Deaths from accidents and from
diseases which strike swiftly and which would not be preceded by pain,
suffering, and loss of ability in earlier years are quite different than those
caused by chronic diseases. Long—term debilitating illnesses would not be
accurately modeled with the early post—sample death measure while future
accidents and the like probably don't affect retirement calculations.
Our study uses a subjective measure of health status which we think is
superior to the aforementioned measures. The RHS solicites answers to the
question "How does your health compare with that of others of the same age?"
The possible responses are better, same, or worse. The public health
literature suggests that subjective ratings by the elderly are highly
correlated with the arguably more objective physician ratings (Ferraro
10(1980)), Mossey and Shapiro (1982)). Also, in the RHS, the people who report
themselves in worse health are twice as likely to die in a four year span as
those in better health (Taubman and Rosen (1982)), and generally display the
properties one would expect in a health production function (Taubman and Rosen
(1982), Asher (1984)). Taubman and Sickles (1984) have used the
objective/subjective health variable to analyze the health effects of the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program with quite reasonable results.
To these subjective rankings we add a fourth category ——deceased.While
the R.HS records a perso&s death when they learn of it during an attempted
reinterview, they often don't obtain this information. We rely instead on
files from Social Security who record this information to stop paying benefits
to the deceased, begin paying survivors their benefits, and to justify paying
burial allowances. Recent work by Duleep (1983) indicates that in recent
years these files are extremely accurate in obtaining death information. The
Social Security data go through 1979. Both year and month of death are
given. We have cross—checked the RHS files against Social Security's
information up to the 1977 survey date. We found 2 instances where the RHS
lists the person as dead but the other file doesn't. We also found that if
Social Security lists an individual as dying between two surveys, the RHS
either lists that individual as having no response or the RHS indicates that
the respondent is the surviving spouse.
Before turning to the results we should point out that a number of
different specifications of the joint health—retirement model were
considered. We first examined a model in which the endogenous variables both
entered in their unobservable forms as right—hand—side variables. Although we
considered only consistent two—Step estimators of these models (Mallar (1977))
our results were not at all supportive of this type of fully latent
11structure. Furthermore, the effect of the unobservable work effort variable
on the health stock was negligible and insignificant. Thequestionof whether
or not a mixed model, in which observed/unobserved endogenous variables appear
on the right hand side, was also considered. Because of the categorical
nature of both endogenous variables, mixed structures or structures in which
just the observed counterparts of both endogenous variables appear on the
right hand side would be forced by coherency conditions to be triangular
(Heckman (1978), Gourieroux, Laf font, and Moufort (1980)). Therefore, only a
model in whIch health affects the mean of retIrement or one In whIch
retirement effects the mean of health (specified as unobservables or as
observable counterparts) are empirically relevant. These are inherently
nonnested models. Two—step procedures were again used to examine competing
structures. The effect of observed retirement status on the health stock was
(as with its latent counterpart) negligible and insignificant. For this
reason and the reasons cited in section 1, we focus on the triangular system
in which health determines the mean level of retirement propensity but in
which no direct feedback is permitted from retirement to health. Unexplained
effects can certainly cause unexplained variations in the two endogenous
variables to be correlated and this provides FIML with an efficiency gain over
LIML.
Due to computational constraints, a random sample of 808 people was
selected from the roughly 8500 people in our original sample. The means and
standard deviations, calculated from the panel, of the variables used in the
analysis are presented in Table 1.
Social Security benefits are the benefits one would expect to receive if
retirement begins in the respective year. It is computed using covered
earnings taken from each persont s Social Security record, which is part of the
12RHS, and then replicating Social Security's rules. Thus we first calculated
each person's Average Monthly Earnings (ANE). This was accomplished by using
the respondent's earnings since 1951, which were truncated at the maximum
allowable earnings level. The five lowest years of income are dropped and the
sum of the remaining incomes is divided by the number of months worked. The
resulting AME is then used to compute the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) based
on the tables in the Social Security Handbook. These account for inflation
and therefore change over the 1969—1977 sample period. Once the PIA was
computed, the benefits total was determined on the basis of PIA and marital
status. By using benefits available rather than those paid to actual
retirees, we avoid an obvious selection problem. It should be pointed out
that since benefits are increased by 50 percent if the individual is married,
the effect of marital status on both retirement and health will depend in part
on the benefits' coefficient.
Income from assets is the sum of yearly income generated from the value
of assets: stocks, bonds, life insurance annuities, etc. Pensions are not
incorporated in this variable but are included separately. The gain from
postponing retirement is calculated by taking earnings in 1969 (In each
respective year these earnings are Inflated by the CPI.) plus the gain in
Social Security benefits from postponing retirement one additional year ——
discountedto the averaged expected lifetime of the individual based on age ——
lessthe Social Security benefits the individual would have received. As
Mitchell and FIelds (1983) have noted, this variable may be positively
correlated with retirement since the substitution effect (away from leisure)
may dominate the income effect (toward leisure). Average income from assets
was lower than average Social Security benefits but close to average pension
income while spouse's earnings were greater than all three.
13We included a dummy variable to indicate whether or not the person was
eligible in 1975 or 1977 for Supplement Security Income (sSI), which began in
1974, and interacted this variable with a time trend to identify changes in
the health stock over time for SSI eligibles. In an earlier study with a
somewhat different model of health, Taubmart and Sickles (1984) found that
those who were eligible to receive SSI in 1975 or 1977 were in worse health In
1969 than those who would not meet the eligibility criterion, but the
differential narrowed over time and became insignificant.
As shown in Table 1 most of the men are married although widowers make up
about 5% of the person—year observations. In our subsample all the men
happened to have been married at some point in their life and the omitted
category is thus divorced/separated. The most common longest occupation was
as a skilled worker with the omitted category of unskilled workers accounting
for roughly 25% of the sample.
An interesting problem arises because eligibility for Social Security's
old age benefits only occurs at age 62. A 60 year old could calculate the
value of his future Social Security benefit stream and obtain an unsecured
loan against it or run down existing assets, but, since (nonhousing) assets
are small, this may be difficult if capital markets are imperferct. We allow
for these difficulties by Including in the retirement equation a pre age 62
dummy variable.5 We now turn to the estimation results.
The retirement equation, presented in Table 2, is familiar to economists
although it has a few novel variables as well as some interesting quantitative
results. The advantages of not retiring in a particular year are given by the
"gain from postponing retirement" variable. It is the most significant of the
5This is not perfectly colinear with a set of time dummies since in 1969 and
1971 some people are not 62.
14income variables and its coefficient an order of magnitude larger than the
asset, spouse's earnings, or pension income coefficients. We can easily
translate the raw coefficients into marginal probabilities at the sample means
by scaling the estimated coefficient by the normal density evaluated at the
estimated mean of the index describing *(2)•6If the gain from postponing
retirement is increased one standard deviation from its sample mean ($739),
then the probability of retiring is reduced by 0.044. Similar increases in
income from assets, spouse's earnings, and pension income increase the
probability of retirement by about .02, .03, arid .035 respectively.
Of the occupation variables, only the self—employed dummy seems to have
any significant explanatory power and the effect is quite sizeable: self—
employment reduces the probability of retiring by 0.18.
During the 1970's retirement benefits paid by Social Security increased
substantially faster than inflation. To some extent benefits grew because of
secular growth in wage rates which help determine an individual's primary
insurance amount and benefits. However, to a large extent, the benefits
increased because of two legislated changes. One was the institution of
Supplemental Security Income (sSI) to the elderly on welfare.7 SSI gave money
to those on welfare and made them eligible for Medicaid. The other change was
the provision of overgenerous protection against changes in the CPI. The
indexing provisions were technically deficient because both the benefit
schedules and earnings histories, to which the benefit schedules were applied,
were shifted with the CPI. Our structural model allows us to examine the
consequences of these changes. In preliminary analysis SSI was found to have
6The mean index for te reçiiit equation is 12.9 and the normal density
orresponding to A1 — is0.391.
To some extent SSI replaced state based Old Age Assistance but on average it
increased benefits substantially.
15an insignificant and second order effect in the retirement equation which is
why it is excluded in our final results. However, Social Security benefits
(embedded in our gain from postponing retirement variable) were quite
significant and had a relatively large effect. The first major change in
benefits occurred from January 1971 to September 1972 and was about 13 percent
in real terms (Leimer and Lesnoy (1983)). The second major change ——basing
benefits on wage—indexed earnings —occurredin September 1977. According to
figures compiled by Summers (1982), the ratios of primary benefits for an
"average—earnings" man retiring at age 65 to earnings in the year before
retirement were 34.3, 39.4, 40.7, 43.6, 45.5 for the years 1971, 73, 75, 77,
79. The effect of these Social Security reforms on the probability of
retirement seems to be quite small, amounting to only .84, .34, 1.90, and 1.25
percentage point increases in the respective years. Although our results do
not directly tell us what effect these reforms had on the age of retirement,
they indicate that its effect is rather limited and are consistent with the
retirement age effects found by Hausman and Wise (1983b) and Fields and
Mitchell (1984).
Turning to the age variable, we find that it is, not surprisely, quite
significant and highly correlated with retirement. Based on its coefficient,
an individual of 62 is almost 17% less likely to retire than an individual of
64. The dummy for being less than 62 has a highly significant negative
coefficient. Finding the effect of age less than 62 is complicated because
changing the variable results in an obvious change in age. If we look at the
effect of aging one year from 61 to 62, then the probability of retiring
increases by almost .31 while aging one year from 60 to 61 increases the
probablity by almost .08. It would seem that there is evidence for either
substantial imperfection in capital markets or a fairly high discount rate for
16the people in our sample.
Years of schooling have an important bearing on the retirement
decision. The better educated retire later in their lives. For example, a
college educated male would, at age 64, be almost .12 less likely to retire
than a high school graduate. While human capital models often assume that the
more educated have the same length of career as the less educated to make the
analytics more tractable, there is no necessary reason for this to occur.
However, it may well reflect the differential work activities of the more
educated which are less affected oy aging.
Married and widowed males are both less likely to retire than those who
are divorced or separated although the coefficient for the widowed category is
not very significant. The actual effect of marital status on retirement is
confounded by the gain from postponing retirement variable. Since benefits
one would receive if one retired are increased by 50% if the individual is
married, there is an obvious interaction between the two variables. At
average levels of the gain from postponing retirement, married males are about
16% less likely to retire than the divorced or separated, with a t—statistic
of —3.37. The widowed are less likely to retire than the divorced or
separated by about .08.
We next focus attention on the health variable which is significant at
the 99% level. Previous work has not considered the form in which health
affects the retirement decision. That is, should health status enter the
retirement equation in its unobservable form or should an observable
counterpart be used? This issue of appropriate specification is in principle
a testable hypothesis. Because of the triangular nature of the system, both
variables could be included in the retirement equation and conventional t—
tests could be carried out. However, as a practical matter the inclusion of
17both health measures will result in severe multicollinearity and render the
test rather powerless. A somewhat different strategy which we use does not
require a composite model to test the hypothesis. Furthermore, it has the
attractive property that the general specification of the model, as opposed to
just the particular hypothesis concerning the appropriate health measure, can
be tested. Under the null hypothesis that the measured health status variable
is appropriate, FIML on the system will result in consistent and
asymptotically efficient estimates. Under the alternative that the retirement
equation is misspecif ted, the FIML estimates of the health equation will be
inconsistent because of specification error in the correlated retirement
equation. However, in this case the LIML estimates of the health equation
will still be consistent. Thus the Hausman—Wu test can be utilized.
The statistic for this test is 15.6 while x1,005 31 suggesting that our
specification is appropriate. Further support for our specification and the
main reason for the relatively low test—statistics, is that the estimated
correlation between equations is only —.101 with a t—statistic of —1.79.
Because the health variable is endogenous, we cannot manipulate the other
explanatory variables since health status is changed by the same variables we
are holding constant in the retirement equation. If we view the change in
health status in an ex ante sense then a movement from a poor to a good health
status reduces the probability of retirement and thus increases expected
average earnings by almost .21. Add to this figure the potential reduction in
medical expenditures owing to better health, and there is a substantial real
income gain from lower morbidity.
Before moving to the health equation estimates we note that the random
effects are sizeable, accounting for almost 1/3 the total variation in the
total error, and highly significant. Heterogeneity is quite evident in the
18retirement decision.
We now turn to the health equation, results for which are presented in
Table 3. Recall that the variable is scaled so that higher numbers indicate
worsening health. We present our results as we did with the retirement
equation and in general compare states of better health with health same as
others of your age.8
Focusing first on the economic variables, we see that the only first—
order effects come from social security benefits and from pension income. For
example, an annual increase in these variables by $10,000 would Increase the
probability of being in better health by about .16 and .09 respectively.9
Eligibility for transfer payments from the Supplemental Security Income
program are not highly significant although the point estimates provide
evidence of the same sort found by Taubman and Sickles (1984).10 Those who
were eligible for SSI in 1975/77 were in worse health in 1969 than those who
would not meet the eligibility criteria but the differential narrowed over
time. From 1969—1977 the probability of being in better health for SSI
eligibles increased by about .16 and the probability of dying fell almost
•.
80therbinary comparisons are easily made by appropriately m9d.fying the
thresholds since the only quantatitive differences are the A'' (and the
average value across states for the explanatory variable whose effect we are
analyzing). The mean index for the health equation is 2.064 and the normal
density associated with the probability of being in better health is 0.349.
This will be the scale factor in analyzing the marginal probabilities
associated with the raw coefficients.
9it is possible that long term Ill health has reduced labor marketactivity
and earnings which determine the benefits. Since we do allow for individual
specific effects in our equations, we don't think this is the cause of the
correlation.
10At average levels of benefits the t—statistic associated with thejoint
hypotheses that SSI has no effect is 1.34.
1'One qualification on the SSI results should be noted. Eligibility for SSI
in 1975 or 1977 Is not completely known for those who died in 1974 or
earlier. For those who died prior to 1975 we do have information on whether
they were receiving state assistance when the survey starts and they were
19The other statistically significant coefficients are on the age, number
of dependents, education and longest occupation variables. Remembering that
health is scaled such that poorer health receives a higher number, the age
effect is not surprising even if people compare themselves to others of the
same age. This means that more older people are dead and/or that people
compare themselves to the median rather than the mean person of the same age.
It is generally argued that the more educated are brighter, are better
equipped to make decisions, make more informed decisions, and adapt new
products more quickly. Thus it is not surprising that the more educated are
in better health, ceteris paribus. An increase in education completed from 12
to 16 years would raise the probability of being in better health by about
.05.
The omitted longest occupation in our sample is unskilled labor who are
in worse health than people in the other occupations. We can not determine if
this occurs because their job worsens their health, because less healthy
people are more likely to work as unskilled laborers, or because poorer people
invest less in health preserving regimes. The probability of being in better
health is .16 lower for unskilled laborers than, for example, those who had
been in management positions.
An increase from two to three dependents increases the probability of
being in better health by almost 2%. There are several possible reasons for
this outcome. First a number of people have argued that larger social
networks lead to better health with people exchanging information on health
and doctor quality.12 Second, healthy (unhealthy) parents may beget healthy
alive. These people were eligible for SSI. However, it seems that we are
still understating the number of eligibles who died prior to 1975. Thus the
health of the SSI group between 1969 and 1975 should be worse than our numbers
would indicate, meaning that the estimated SSI dummy and the relative
improvement over time for the SSI group are probably understated.
20(unhealthy) children. The unhealthy children may die early. Moreover
unhealthy parents may chose to have fewer children because of their low income
and energy levels.
We can also examine the direct effect of legislated changes in Social
Security benefits on the healthiness of the aged and, through the health and
gain from postponing retirement variables, on their propensity to retire.
Based on Summerst figures the total change from 1971—79 in the probability of
being in better health due to the reforms was only .0199. The feedback from
the health equation would lessen the probability of retiring by only about
.2%, reducing the 2.8% direct increase in the probability of retiring due to
the Social Security reforms of 1971—79 changes to about 2.6%.
Heterogeneity is significant and important in the health equation.
Although the relative size of the random effects is smaller than with the
retirement equation, random effects still contribute almost 30% to the total
unexplained variation in the health stock.
A final comment should be made about the use of FIML over LIML
estimation. The former is approximately an order of magnitude more cpu
intensive than the latter. Controlling for heterogeneity in both the
retirment and the health equations using direct controls and individual
specific random effects seems quite adequate in reducing the correlation in
unexplained variations to a small (—.101) and marginally insignificant Ct—
statistic =—1.79)level. It is not as clear that the substantial
computational investment needed to carry Out FIML on models of this sort is
justified.
'2See Asher (1982) for a survey on social networks' impact on health andsome
important evidence.
214. Conclusions
This study has focused on the structural estimation of a joint health—
retirement model in which both sample truncation and error dependencies
substantially complicate the implementation of an efficient estimator. We
have been able to isolate the effect of perceived health status' on the
retirement decision in a structural setting. Furthermore, we have performed
several important policy simulations to see how the double indexing and
increased transfer payments affected the retirement decision both directly and
by way of modifications in the health status of the eligible Individuals. Our
results indicate that retirement decisions are strongly affected by health
status, variables that change the shape and position of the income/leisure
opportunity set, marital status, self employment status and education. We
also find that those not yet eligible for Social Security status are far less
likely to retire. This suggests that if part of the solution to the known
future financing difficulties of the Social Security System involves raising
the normal retirement age to 67 or 68, then a major policy decision is whether
to leave 62 as the early retirement age or to raise it to 64 or 65. The
latter change would induce more people to work longer and pay more taxes.
Our health equation results Indicate that Social Security and pension
payments have positive effects on healthiness. The other significant
variables are number of dependents and longest occupation being unskilled.
We calculate that the planned and unplanned increases in Social Security
benefits in the 1970's raised the probability of retirement by about .026 and
increased the percentage in better health by almost .02.
We also find that random effects are quite Important in both equations.
However, due to the rather small and marginally significant estimated
correlation between equations after we control for heterogeneity, efficiency
22gains from a FLMLdonot appear to be worth the cubstantlal computational
inveatnient necessary for its implementation.
23Table 1
Sample Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Age 64.3 3.31




Number of Dependents .229 .713
Receiving SSI .0275 .166




Skilled Labor .429 .495
Management .150 .357
Self—Employed .104 .305
Social Security Benefits 1716. 1642.
Income From Assets 1113. 3782.



















Skilled Laborer .0613 0.51
Management .00286 0.02
Self—Employed —.468 —6.61
Income From Assets .138 x iO 2.17
Spouse's Earnings .169 x 1O4 2.44
Pension Income .249 x io 2.14
Gain From Postponing —.151 x IO —4.63
Retirement
Health .263 3.13



















SSI x Time —.0540 —1.21
Income From Assets —.594 x 10' —0.99
S.S. Benefits —.462 x io —3.29
Pension Income —.266 x io —4.09
Spouse's Earnings —.131 x 10 —0.27
Threshold 1 1.55 3.66
Threshold 2 3.08 7.53
Threshold 3 4.08 9.76
.375 19.6
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